Аннотация:diversification, size, and risk.Much of this work in the fields of law, economics, and finance is masterfully summarized by Shleifer and Vishny, 8 and need not be repeated here.Related work is found in the organization theory and strategy literatures as well.9 Other academic research attempts to link the nature and structure of managerial compensation to firm performance.The underlying premise is that stock-based compensation packages provide managers with greater incentives to maximize shareholder value.10 Jensen extends the agency-cost theory to argue that managerial malfeasance is positively related to the amount of free cash flows that managers have at their disposal. 11Empirical tests of this theory typically use measures of free cash flow as an independent variable in cross-sectional analyses of firm performance.12 Likewise, there is an expanding literature that attempts to link the composition of the board of directors to firm performance.The underlying thesis is that outside directors are better, more objective monitors of managerial behavior, and, therefore, firms with greater outside representation on the board are run more in the interest of the firm's stockholders and less in the interest of self-serving managers.13 8.
