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Expressivism, Belief,and All That Sebastian Köhler2017 год

Expressivism, Belief, and All That
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Аннотация: According to expressivism, normative judgements are non-representational motivational states.Traditionally, this was understood as the commitment that normative judgements are not beliefs.However, quasi-realist expressivists have recently argued, via minimalism about "belief," that expressivism is compatible with normative judgements being beliefs.Quasi-realists have yet to explain, though, how they account for the contents of these beliefs.Specifically, they have not developed their preferred option, a "minimalist" or "deflationist" account of such contents.This paper remedies this gap.The paper proceeds as follows: Section one presents expressivism, quasirealism, and why quasi-realists need an account of the contents of normative beliefs.Section two explains why quasi-realists should resist William Dunaway's minimalist treatment of such contents.Section three introduces a general framework for deflationism about the contents of beliefs.Section four explains how this view fits with expressivism and allows expressivists to hold that normative judgements are beliefs.Expressivists' concession that normative judgements are beliefs forces us to revise our understanding of expressivism.The fourth section suggests how, and how it helps expressivists to account for the contents of normative beliefs.The section also sketches how to apply the account to other propositional attitudes.
Год издания: 2017
Авторы: Sebastian Köhler
Издательство: Philosophy Documentation Center
Источник: The Journal of Philosophy
Другие ссылки: The Journal of Philosophy (HTML)
PhilPapers (PhilPapers Foundation) (PDF)
PhilPapers (PhilPapers Foundation) (HTML)