Dignity, Esteem, and Social Contribution: A Recognition‐Theoretical Viewстатья из журнала
Аннотация: and two anonymous referees for JPP, for helpful comments.1 This recognition-theoretical view is developed in Honneth 1996, 2003a, and in Anderson and Honneth 2005.In this paper I draw freely on Honneth's work, but I also depart from it when necessary.My aim is to make the recognition-theoretical view useful for the analysis of dignity, not to offer an "orthodox" Honnethian interpretation of dignity. 2 For similar distinctions see also Darwall 1977;Sachs 1981. Honneth 1996, p. 122. 2 beings possess equal dignity in virtue of being human, the ability to live a dignified live is distributed unequally among humans.While the respect requirement is widely accepted in the philosophical literature on dignity, the social esteem requirement has received little attention so far.In what follows I will explain the distinction between respect and social esteem in more detail and argue that in modern capitalist societies social esteem is distributed primarily according to a subject's position in the social division of labour.Next, I will consider three phenomena which pose a threat to human dignity because they deprive subjects of social esteem: unemployment, precarious employment, and low pay.This will lead me to the interim conclusion that substantial social and economic reforms would be needed in order to enable people to live dignified lives.However, in the final section of the paper I will argue that attention to the social esteem requirement complicates appeals to human dignity as a social-critical concept, because it can be asserted as a positional good.When people assert their own dignity by comparing themselves favourably to others, who they claim are less dignified, dignity can prop up rather than undermine social hierarchies.As a result, the theory outlined in the first three sections does not give us the full picture, and dignified lives elude some people despite the fact that they make a contribution to socially shared goals.
Год издания: 2017
Авторы: Timo Jütten
Издательство: Wiley
Источник: Journal of Political Philosophy
Ключевые слова: Political Philosophy and Ethics, Patient Dignity and Privacy, Free Will and Agency
Другие ссылки: Journal of Political Philosophy (HTML)
Open Access at Essex (University of Essex) (HTML)
Open Access at Essex (University of Essex) (HTML)
Open Access at Essex (University of Essex) (HTML)
Open Access at Essex (University of Essex) (HTML)
Открытый доступ: green
Том: 25
Выпуск: 3
Страницы: 259–280