Populism and competitive authoritarianism in the Andesстатья из журнала
Аннотация: Abstract Although military rule disappeared in Latin America after 1990, other forms of authoritarianism persisted. Competitive authoritarianism, in which democratic institutions exist but incumbent abuse skews the playing field against opponents, emerged in Peru, Venezuela, Bolivia, and Ecuador during the post-Cold War period. This article seeks to explain the emergence of competitive authoritarianism in the Andes. It argues that populism – the election of a personalistic outsider who mobilizes voters with an anti-establishment appeal – is a major catalyst for the emergence of competitive authoritarianism. Lacking experience with representative democratic institutions, possessing an electoral mandate to destroy the existing elite, and facing institutions of horizontal accountability controlled by that elite, populists have an incentive to launch plebiscitary attacks on institutions of horizontal accountability. Where they succeed, weak democracies almost invariably slide into competitive authoritarianism. The argument is demonstrated through a comparative analysis of all 14 elected presidents in Bolivia, Ecuador, Peru, and Venezuela between 1990 and 2010. Keywords: populismcompetitive authoritarianismdemocracyLatin America Acknowledgements The authors thank Aaron Watanabe for his research assistance and Santiago Anria, Maxwell Cameron, Kenneth Greene, Evelyne Huber, Raúl Madrid, John Stephens, and Eric Wibbels for comments on earlier versions of this paper. Notes Levitsky and Way, Competitive Authoritarianism. Ibid. de la Torre, Populist Seduction in Latin America; Hawkins, Venezuela's Chavismo; Mudde and Rovira, Populism in Europe and the Americas. A substantial literature on competitive authoritarianism and other hybrid regimes emerged in the 2000s. See Levitsky and Way, Competitive Authoritarianism; Diamond, "Thinking about Hybrid Regimes"; Schedler, "The Menu of Manipulation"; Schedler, Electoral Authoritarianism; Howard and Roessler, "Liberalizing Electoral Outcomes." Castañeda, Mexican Shock, 131. Levitsky and Way, Competitive Authoritarianism. Haggard and Kaufman, Political Economy of Democratic Transitions. Przeworski, Democracy and the Market; O'Donnell, "Delegative Democracy." Ross, "Does Oil Hinder Democracy?" Weyland, "Rise of Latin America's Two Lefts"; Weyland et al., Leftist Governments in Latin America. Fish, Democracy Derailed in Russia; Greene, Why Dominant Parties Lose. Flores-Macías, "Statist vs. Pro-Market"; Madrid, "Perils of Personalism." Weyland, "Clarifying a Contested Concept." Barr, "Anti-Establishment Politics." Ibid., 30–2. Ibid., 33–4. See also Kenney, "Outsider and Anti-Party Politicians," 59. Barr uses the term "plebiscitarian linkage", but because plebiscitarianism is often understood as a strategy of governing rather than a type of political appeal, we follow the example of other scholars who use the term "personalism". See, for example, Weyland, "Clarifying a Contested Concept"; Roberts, "Latin America's Populist Revival." Barr, "Anti-Establishment Politics," 35–6. On radial categories and diminished subtypes, see Collier and Levitsky, "Democracy with Adjectives." On populism as a radial category, see Roberts, "Transformation of Populism." de la Torre, Populist Seduction in Latin America; Hawkins, Venezuela's Chavismo; Mudde and Rovira, Populism in Europe and the Americas. See Barr, "Anti-Establishment Politics." This conceptualization helps to resolve scholarly disagreement over the Bolivian case. Whereas many scholars describe Evo Morales as a populist, given his anti-establishment appeal (for example Hawkins, Venezuela's Chavismo), others describe him as "the very antithesis of populism", given the bottom-up nature of the social movement that brought him to power (Roberts, "Latin America's Populist Revival," 14). Mudde and Rovira, Populism in Europe and the Americas. On the inclusionary effects of classical populism in Latin America, see Collier and Collier, Shaping the Political Arena. Doyle, "Legitimacy of Political Institutions." Levitsky and Cameron, "Democracy Without Parties?" Doyle, "Legitimacy of Political Institutions." Mainwaring, "Crisis of Representation in the Andes." Although we exclude Colombia from the analysis, it is worth noting that the country experienced neither populism nor competitive authoritarianism during the 1990–2010 period. Álvaro Uribe is sometimes labelled a populist, but he was a career politician whose electoral appeal – though personalistic – was not anti-establishment. See Dugas, "Emergence of Neopopulism in Colombia?"; Hawkins, Venezuela's Chavismo, 76. Prior to the 1980s, no democracy had survived for more than 12 years in Bolivia, Ecuador, or Peru. Stein et al., Politics of Policies, 68–9, 88. Where possible, we draw on Hawkins' index of populist discourse. See Hawkins, Venezuela's Chavismo. Thus, Hugo Banzer ceased to be an outsider after governing as a dictator, as did Lucio Gutiérrez and Alejandro Toledo after their presidencies. Madrid, "Perils of Personalism," 15. Levitsky and Way, Competitive Authoritarianism, 5–16, 365–8. Civil liberties violations include attacks on independent media, opposition politicians or activists, or other government critics, as well as significant restrictions on freedom of speech or association. Violations must affect the partisan opposition. Other abuse, such as police violence against civilians and human rights violations committed during counterinsurgency, may be considered undemocratic, but they are not indicators of competitive authoritarianism. In his comparative analysis of populist discourse, Hawkins describes Sánchez de Lozada as "by all accounts not populist." See Hawkins, Venezuela's Chavismo, 112. Gamarra and Malloy, "Patrimonial Dynamics," 415, 420. Gamarra, "Bolivia: Managing Democracy," 76–9. Ibid., 90. Ibid., 80; Mayorga, "Bolivia's Democracy," 164. Klein, Concise History of Bolivia, 240. Mayorga, "Bolivia's Democracy," 173. Ibid., 173, 171. Dozens of people were killed and hundreds were injured or illegally detained. See Van Cott, "From Exclusion to Inclusion," 769–70. Banzer resigned in 2001 and was succeeded by Vice President Jorge Quiroga. Van Cott, "From Exclusion to Inclusion," 758. Under Bolivia's system of "parliamentarized presidentialism," presidents were chosen by Congress when no candidate won a majority of the popular vote. See Mayorga, "Bolivia's Democracy," 153. Buitrago, "Civil Society, Social Protest," 103. Sánchez de Lozada was succeeded by Vice-president Carlos Mesa, who governed until 2005, when he, too, was forced to resign amid mass protest. He was replaced by Eduardo Rodríguez. Van Cott, "From Exclusion to Inclusion," 762–63. Morales was expelled from Congress in 2002 for allegedly inciting violence against the government. See Van Cott, "From Exclusion to Inclusion," 772. Madrid, "Bolivia: Origins and Policies," 256. Madrid, Rise of Ethnic Politics, 66. Gamarra, "Evo Morales and Democracy," 129. On Hawkins' index of populist discourse, Morales received a score of 1.6 out a possible 2.0, which is higher, for example, than that of Perón. See Hawkins, Venezuela's Chavismo, 76. See Roberts, "Latin America's Populist Revival." Madrid, "Bolivia: Origins and Policies," 241. Ibid., 241–42. Dunkerley, "Evo Morales," 165–6. Madrid, "Bolivia: Origins and Policies," 252. Lehoucq, "Bolivia's Constitutional Breakdown"; Madrid, Rise of Ethnic Politics, 182. Lehoucq, "Bolivia's Constitutional Breakdown," 119; Gamarra, "Evo Morales and Democracy," 150. Madrid, "Bolivia: Origins and Policies," 254–5. Madrid, Rise of Ethnic Politics, 179–180. Gamarra, "Evo Morales and Democracy," 150. Madrid, "Bolivia: Origins and Policies," 252. Human Rights Watch, "Unequivocally Condemn Mob Violence." March 12, 2009. http://www.hrw.org/news/2009/03/12/bolivia-unequivocally-condemn-mob-violence See Freedom House, "Bolivia". Freedom of the Press 2011. http://www.freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-press/2011/bolivia; Human Rights Watch, "Bolivia." World Report 2012. http://www.hrw.org/world-report-2012/bolivia Conaghan and Malloy, Unsettling Statecraft, 229. Hey and Klak, "From Protectionism Towards Neoliberalism," 78. Mejía Acosta, "Crafting Legislative Ghost Coalitions," 81–2. Hey and Klak, "From Protectionism Towards Neoliberalism," 77–8. Conaghan and Malloy, Unsettling Statecraft, 229. de la Torre, Populist Seduction in Latin America. Freidenberg, Jama, caleta y camello. de la Torre, Populist Seduction in Latin America. Quoted in Sosa-Bucholz, "Strange Career of Populism," 153. de la Torre, Populist Seduction in Latin America, 81. Ibid. Pérez-Liñán, Presidential Impeachment, 25. Mejía Acosta and Polga-Hecimovich, "Parliamentary Solutions," 81. Pérez-Liñán, Presidential Impeachment, 107. Andrade, "'Culture' as Stereotype," 244–6. See also Lucero, "Crisis and Contention in Ecuador," 63. "Ecuador: Bucaram II?," The Economist, June 4, 1998. http://www.economist.com/node/132482 Pachano, "Ecuador," 268–9. Lucero, "Crisis and Contention in Ecuador," 60. Mejía Acosta and Polga-Hecimovich, "Parliamentary Solutions," 82–3. Lucero, "Crisis and Contention in Ecuador." Gutiérrez was imprisoned after the coup, but later pardoned. Ray, "'Anti-Establishment' Party Organization," 17–20. Montúfar, "El populismo intermitente," 274. Quoted in Montúfar, "El populismo intermitente," 272–7. Quoted in Gutiérrez Sanín, "Fragile Democracy," 126. Montúfar, "El populismo intermitente," 280. Mejía Acosta and Polga-Hecimovich, "Parliamentary Solutions," 83–4. Quoted in Montúfar, "El populismo intermitente," 279, 295. Montúfar, "El populismo intermitente," 279, 288. Conaghan, "Bucaram en Panamá," 257–60. Mejía Acosta, "Ecuador," 5–7. Ramírez Gallegos, La insurrección de abril, 19. Mejía Acosta and Polga-Hecimovich, "Parliamentary Solutions," 84. Montúfar, "El populismo intermitente." Conaghan and de la Torre, "Permanent Campaign," 271. Conaghan, "Ecuador: Correa's Plebiscitary Presidency," 48–50. Conaghan and de la Torre, "Permanent Campaign," 271. de la Torre, Populist Seduction in Latin America, 179. Conaghan and de la Torre, "Permanent Campaign," 271. Conaghan, "Ecuador: Correa's Plebiscitary Presidency," 51. Mejía Acosta, "Ecuador," 2. Conaghan, "Ecuador: Correa's Plebiscitary Presidency," 51–2. Ibid., 51–2. Ibid., 52. Ibid., 57. See Freedom House, "Ecuador." Freedom in the World 2010. http://www.freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/2010/ecuador?page=22&year=2010&country=7815 See Human Rights Watch, "Ecuador." World Report 2011. http://www.hrw.org/es/world-report-2011/ecuador Human Rights Watch, "Ecuador: Don't Prosecute President's Critics." March 31, 2011. http://www.hrw.org/news/2011/03/31/ecuador-don-t-prosecute-president-s-critics. Correa won more than $30 million in compensation, although he eventually withdrew the charges. Conaghan and de la Torre, "Permanent Campaign," 277. European Union, "Ecuador 2007: Final Report." Roberts, "Neoliberalism and the Transformation of Populism"; Weyland, "Neopopulism and Neoliberalism." Planas, La democracia volátil, 350. Degregori and Grompone, Demonios y redentores, 96–7. Cameron, "Political and Economic Origins," 43. de la Torre, Populist Seduction in Latin America, 124. Cotler, Política y sociedad, 206–208; Kenney, Fujimori's Coup, 129, 136. Quoted in McClintock, "La voluntad política presidencial," 65. See also Cameron, "Political and Economic Origins," 54–5. Roberts, "Neoliberalism and the Transformation of Populism," 97–8. Tanaka, Los espejismos de la democracia, 212–213. See also Kenney, Fujimori's Coup, 177–191. Quoted in Cameron, "Political and Economic Origins," 56. Kenney, Fujimori's Coup, 228. Degregori, "Vanishing of a Regime," 220. Rospigliosi, Montesinos y las fuerzas armadas. Durand, Riqueza económica y pobreza política, 459–63. Conaghan, Fujimori's Peru; Cameron, "Endogenous Regime Breakdown." Fowks, Suma y resta de la realidad, 68–72. Conaghan, Fujimori's Peru, 121–2. Ibid., 126–30. Ibid., 92–3, 168. Tanaka, Democracia sin partidos. Vera, "Toledo." On Hawkins' comparative index, Toledo's populism score is 0.3 out of a possible 2.0, which is equal to Vicente Fox and Lula. See Hawkins, Venezuela's Chavismo, 76. Degregori, "Peru: A Missed Opportunity," 264. Degregori, "Peru: A Missed Opportunity." Vergara, Ni amnésicos ni irracionales. Cameron, "The Left Turn that Wasn't," 377. Karl, Paradox of Plenty. Hawkins, Venezuela's Chavismo, 17. Crisp, Levine, and Molina, "Rise and Decline of COPEI," 288. Coppedge, "Prospects for Democratic Governability," 52–3. Morgan, Bankrupt Representation, 138. Coppedge, "Prospects for Democratic Governability," 53. Schuyler, "Perspectives on Venezuelan Democracy," 17–8. Crisp, "Presidential Behavior," 195–97. Crisp, Levine, and Molina, "Rise and Decline of COPEI," 278. Corrales, Presidents Without Parties, 223. Roberts, "Social Correlates," 36. Ibid., 53. Hawkins, Venezuela's Chavismo, 50–86. Quoted in López Maya, Del viernes negro al referendo revocatorio, 222. Quoted in Hawkins, Venezuela's Chavismo, 55. Roberts, "Social Correlates," 52. Brewer-Carías, Dismantling Democracy, 15. Coppedge, "Popular Sovereignty versus Liberal Democracy," 187–8. Ibid., 188. Corrales and Penfold, Dragon in the Tropics, 78. Hsieh et al., "Price of Political Opposition," 202. See Hsieh et al., "Price of Political Opposition." See Corrales and Penfold, Dragon in the Tropics. Corrales and Penfold, "Crowding Out the Opposition," 106. Corrales, "Setback for Chávez," 127–9. Ibid., 122. Madrid, "Bolivia: Origins and Policies," 241–2. Levitsky and Way, Competitive Authoritarianism.
Год издания: 2013
Авторы: Steven Levitsky, James Loxton
Издательство: Taylor & Francis
Источник: Democratization
Ключевые слова: Politics and Society in Latin America, Populism, Right-Wing Movements, Political Conflict and Governance
Открытый доступ: closed
Том: 20
Выпуск: 1
Страницы: 107–136